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Finding	  Babies	  in	  Many	  Baths	  
	  
Evolution:	  The	  History	  of	  an	  Idea,	  3rd	  ed.	  	  By	  Peter	  Bowler.	  Berkeley:	  University	  of	  California	  Press,	  2003.	  464	  pp.	  Paper,	  $24.95.	  	  Peter	  Bowler’s	  1984	  book	  Evolution:	  The	  History	  of	  an	  Idea	  is	  a	  standard	  introductory	  history	  of	  theories	  of	  biological	  evolution.	  A	  minor	  revision	  in	  1989	  updated	  some	  of	  the	  material,	  but	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  this	  third	  edition	  Bowler	  has	  completely	  rewritten	  the	  book	  to	  “reflect	  the	  large	  scale	  changes	  that	  were	  taking	  place	  in	  the	  way	  we	  view	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  evolutionism”	  (p.	  xi).	  The	  book	  presents	  an	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  yet	  accessible	  introduction	  for	  the	  nonexpert	  on	  the	  intellectual	  history	  of	  evolution	  and	  evolutionism,	  defined	  by	  Bowler	  as	  “any	  theory	  postulating	  a	  natural	  process	  for	  the	  development	  of	  life	  on	  earth”	  (p.	  xvi).	  	  Bowler	  intends	  to	  present	  us	  with	  a	  nontriumphalist	  view	  of	  the	  rise	  of	  evolutionism,	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  paths	  that	  led	  to	  the	  current	  widespread	  scientific	  acceptance	  of	  Darwin’s	  natural	  selection	  account	  of	  evolution	  and	  of	  the	  dead	  ends	  that	  philosophers	  and	  scientists	  of	  previous	  generations	  took	  toward	  understanding	  the	  creation	  and	  development	  of	  life	  on	  Earth.	  He	  intends	  to	  review	  the	  Darwinian	  revolution	  before	  Darwin	  and	  the	  non-­‐Darwinian	  revolution	  after	  Darwin	  (Bowler,	  1988).	  His	  text	  takes	  us	  to	  the	  present,	  reviewing	  debates	  in	  contemporary	  evolutionary	  science	  and	  debates	  in	  society	  (e.g.,	  creationism,	  intelligent	  design	  theory).	  	  This	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  material	  to	  cover.	  The	  book’s	  commendable	  comprehensiveness	  comes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  length.	  The	  book	  weighs	  in	  at	  almost	  400	  pages,	  excluding	  bibliography;	  moreover,	  the	  reader	  who	  is	  not	  familiar	  with	  many	  of	  the	  perspectives	  on	  evolution	  that	  preceded	  the	  currently	  dominant	  approach	  (the	  modern	  synthesis)	  can	  easily	  be	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  subtle	  differences	  between	  the	  many	  different	  theories	  that	  have	  appeared	  over	  the	  centuries,	  especially	  because	  Bowler	  necessarily	  has	  to	  cover	  these	  approaches	  briefly	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  them	  all.	  Because	  aspects	  of	  the	  various	  theories	  reappear	  over	  time,	  however,	  close	  attention	  to	  the	  different	  perspectives	  is	  worthwhile.	  	  
The	  benefit	  of	  Darwinian	  history	  for	  psychologists	  	  Although	  it	  is	  probably	  not	  a	  bad	  thing	  for	  everyone	  to	  familiarize	  themselves	  with	  the	  history	  of	  Darwinism-­‐one	  of	  the	  two	  or	  three	  most	  important	  scientific	  theories	  of	  the	  modern	  age-­‐this	  is	  the	  American	  Journal	  of	  Psychology.	  	  What	  is	  there	  about	  this	  book	  that	  can	  benefit	  psychologists	  and	  the	  field	  of	  psychology?	  	  	  	  Readers	  whose	  professional	  interests	  include	  the	  psychology	  of	  science	  and	  scientific	  discovery	  (see	  Tweney,	  1998)	  may	  be	  one	  psychological	  audience	  for	  this	  book.	  Although	  it	  may	  provide	  some	  basic	  raw	  data,	  however,	  the	  coverage	  of	  any	  
specific	  theorist	  and	  the	  process	  by	  which	  his	  or	  her	  theoretical	  ideas	  were	  developed	  is	  not	  sufficiently	  deep	  or	  sufficiently	  focused	  on	  psychological	  processes	  to	  be	  of	  much	  value	  to	  this	  audience.	  Bowler	  is	  not	  to	  be	  faulted	  for	  this,	  of	  course:	  He	  is	  a	  historian,	  not	  a	  psychologist.	  Given	  that,	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  this	  book	  is	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  sociological,	  historical,	  and	  political	  forces	  that	  shaped	  the	  development	  of	  ideas	  than	  on	  the	  intraindividual	  psychological	  processes.	  	  A	  bigger	  benefit	  of	  this	  book	  for	  psychologists,	  then,	  is	  not	  in	  the	  specific	  study	  of	  how	  Darwinian	  ideas	  were	  developed	  but	  in	  broader	  lessons	  of	  how	  competing	  theories	  grow,	  how	  conflicts	  within	  science	  can	  best	  contribute	  to	  advancing	  our	  understanding	  of	  scientific	  phenomena,	  and	  how	  we	  should	  respond	  to	  theories	  that	  challenge	  our	  beliefs	  or	  ideologies.	  
	  
Conflict	  in	  science	  	  Bowler	  has	  long	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  result	  ofDarwin's	  publication	  of	  Origin	  of	  Speciesw	  as	  not	  the	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  the	  natural	  selection	  mechanism	  as	  the	  means	  by	  which	  evolution	  occurred.	  Rather,	  "Darwin	  succeeded	  in	  converting	  the	  world	  to	  evolutionism	  not	  because	  he	  had	  the	  theory	  of	  natural	  selection,	  but	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  most	  of	  his	  fellow	  biologists	  had	  major	  reservations	  about	  it"	  (Bowler,	  1993,	  p.	  3).	  Agreement	  that	  evolution	  was	  caused	  because	  organisms	  possessing	  certain	  variants	  of	  a	  feature	  were	  selected	  (i.e.,	  were	  more	  successful	  at	  surviving	  and	  reproducing	  in	  a	  given	  environment)	  did	  not	  emerge	  until	  the	  early	  20th	  century.	  	  In	  the	  meantime,	  a	  variety	  of	  theories	  were	  offered	  as	  to	  how	  evolution	  occurred.	  Both	  these	  post-­‐Origin	  theories	  and	  the	  theories	  that	  preceded	  Darwin	  can	  be	  looked	  upon	  from	  our	  vantage	  point	  as	  wrong.	  But	  we	  should	  learn	  the	  lesson	  that	  these	  theories	  often	  contained	  important	  precursors	  and	  parallels	  to	  currently	  accepted	  ideas	  in	  evolutionary	  science	  and	  introduced	  important	  concepts	  that	  play	  a	  part	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  Darwinism.	  In	  the	  early	  19th	  century,	  for	  example,	  French	  anatomist	  Georges	  Cuvier	  proposed	  a	  model	  of	  comparative	  anatomy	  emphasizing	  commonality	  of	  internal	  structures	  of	  animals	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  their	  relationship.	  Cuvier	  retained	  the	  notion	  that	  species	  had	  immutable	  structures,	  so	  this	  identification	  of	  common	  form	  was	  viewed	  as	  a	  "perfect	  expression	  of	  the	  argument	  from	  design."	  However,	  when	  this	  commitment	  to	  the	  fixity	  of	  species	  was	  relaxed	  by	  later	  theorists,	  "they	  realized	  that	  each	  form	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  superficially	  modified	  version	  of	  a	  basic	  animal	  type	  which	  Darwin	  would	  interpret	  as	  the	  common	  ancestor	  of	  its	  group"	  (p.	  109).	  	  The	  application	  of	  comparative	  study	  to	  evolution	  also	  benefited	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  homologous	  and	  analogous	  biological	  features,	  developed	  by	  Richard	  Owen	  in	  the	  1840s.	  Analogies	  are	  features	  in	  different	  species	  that	  share	  an	  adaptive	  similarity	  but	  are	  not	  related	  to	  one	  another;	  homologies	  are	  shared	  features	  that	  stem	  from	  a	  shared	  history.	  For	  Owen,	  the	  shared	  history	  of	  homologous	  features	  provided	  evidence	  not	  of	  natural	  selection	  but	  of	  an	  underlying	  intelligent	  
design.	  Once	  again,	  it	  was	  only	  when	  biologists	  took	  these	  valuable	  concepts	  out	  of	  an	  otherwise	  scientifically	  less	  valuable	  perspective	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  use	  the	  homology	  concept	  to	  understand	  the	  common	  evolution	  of	  various	  species.	  	  These	  and	  numerous	  other	  examples	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  valuable	  insights	  into	  the	  development	  of	  life	  can	  be	  drawn	  from	  otherwise	  unacceptable	  theoretical	  positions	  should	  give	  psychologists	  pause.	  Psychology	  (and	  other	  human	  sciences)	  has	  often	  lurched	  forward	  through	  dramatic	  theoretical	  controversies,	  where	  proponents	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  controversy	  take	  more	  than	  a	  scientific	  interest	  in	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  the	  competing	  perspective	  (e.g.,	  psychoanalysis	  vs.	  cognitive-­‐behavioral	  approaches,	  radical	  behaviorism	  vs.	  cognitivism,	  situationism	  vs.	  dispositionalism,	  psychoanalysis	  vs.	  feminism,	  social	  constructionism	  or	  phenomenology	  vs.	  nomothetic	  empiricism).	  The	  risk	  posed	  by	  these	  sorts	  of	  conflicts	  is	  that	  each	  side	  in	  the	  debate	  rejects	  in	  toto	  the	  insights	  of	  the	  other,	  thereby	  impeding	  what	  is	  presumably	  our	  mutual	  goal:	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  mind	  (however	  you	  construe	  that	  term)	  works.	  	  The	  application	  of	  Darwinism	  to	  psychology	  has	  suffered	  from	  this	  problem	  at	  least	  as	  much	  as	  any	  other	  psychological	  perspective.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  the	  implication	  that	  humans	  were	  of	  a	  piece	  with	  other	  species	  that	  has	  most	  raised	  objections	  to	  evolutionism	  over	  the	  centuries,	  and	  it	  was	  E.	  O.	  Wilson's	  (1975,	  1978)	  bold	  pronouncements	  about	  the	  implications	  of	  evolution	  for	  human	  behavior	  that	  most	  enraged	  his	  critics.	  	  Since	  the	  late	  1980s,	  reference	  to	  evolutionary	  concepts	  have	  increased	  manyfold	  in	  the	  psychological	  literature	  (see	  Scher	  &	  Rauscher,	  2003,	  for	  further	  discussion).	  This	  rise	  probably	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  forceful	  and	  effective	  advocacy	  of	  scholars	  promoting	  a	  view	  they	  call	  evolutionary	  psychology	  (e.g.,	  Buss,	  1995,	  2004;	  Cosmides	  &	  Tooby,	  1997;	  Dennett,	  1995;	  Pinker,	  1997,	  2002;	  Tooby	  &	  Cosmides,	  1992)	  and	  to	  vociferous	  critics	  of	  the	  specific	  approach	  and	  of	  any	  application	  of	  evolution	  to	  human	  psychology	  generally	  (see	  Rose	  &	  Rose,	  2000)	  	  The	  term	  evolutionary	  psychology	  as	  a	  long	  history	  (see	  Stanley,	  1895);	  however,	  the	  modern-­‐day	  proponents	  of	  evolutionary	  psychology	  insist	  that	  only	  a	  specific	  metatheoretical	  perspective	  is	  appropriate	  for	  the	  evolutionary	  study	  of	  mind	  and	  behavior.	  This	  perspective	  combines	  the	  adaptationist	  and	  gene-­‐centered	  approach	  to	  evolutionary	  biology	  with	  the	  modular,	  cognitive	  approach	  to	  psychology	  (see	  Scher	  &	  Rauscher,	  2003).	  	  In	  contrast,	  a	  number	  of	  recent	  publications	  have	  appeared	  recently	  arguing	  that	  room	  must	  be	  made	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  valid	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  evolutionary	  psychology	  (Caporael,	  2001;	  Heyes,	  2000;	  Laland	  &	  Brown,	  2002;	  Moore	  &	  Michel,	  1998;	  Scher	  &	  Rauscher,	  2003).	  The	  specific	  approach	  advocated	  by	  Cosmides,	  Buss,	  Pinker,	  and	  others	  (which	  I	  have	  called	  cognitive	  adaptationism;	  Scher,	  2004)	  has	  valid	  insights	  to	  offer.	  However,	  any	  insistence	  that	  one	  specific	  approach	  is	  the	  way	  to	  proceed,	  and	  other	  approaches	  have	  nothing	  to	  offer,	  is	  
counterproductive	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  advancing	  the	  science	  of	  psychology	  (although	  it	  may	  be	  effective	  for	  the	  short-­‐term	  advancement	  of	  one's	  particular	  scientific	  perspective).	  	  Researchers	  in	  evolutionary	  psychology,	  broadly	  construed,	  need	  to	  learn	  the	  lesson	  strewn	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  Darwinism:	  Very	  few	  biological	  theories	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  completely	  wrong	  (and	  very	  few	  completely	  right;	  even	  Darwin	  got	  many	  things	  wrong).	  Rather	  than	  myopically	  focus	  on	  one's	  own	  approach,	  evolutionary	  psychologists	  must	  be	  open	  to	  drawing	  the	  valuable	  out	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  theories	  and	  synthesizing	  the	  various	  approaches;	  this	  almost	  certainly	  will	  result	  in	  better,	  more	  useful	  theoretical	  approaches.	  	  The	  prime	  example	  of	  this	  process	  in	  the	  history	  of	  evolution	  is	  the	  modern	  synthesis	  of	  evolution	  and	  genetics	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  20th	  century	  and	  has	  underpinned	  nearly	  all	  of	  biology	  since.	  As	  Bowler	  points	  out,	  at	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  genetics	  was	  presented	  as	  evidence	  against	  evolution	  and	  natural	  selection:	  The	  discontinuous	  variation	  implied	  in	  Mendelian	  genetics	  and	  demonstrable	  in	  experimental	  studies	  in	  the	  lab	  seemed	  to	  be	  incompatible	  with	  the	  continuous	  variation	  that	  would	  be	  needed	  for	  natural	  selection	  to	  function	  as	  predicted.	  Naturalists	  working	  in	  the	  field,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  saw	  continuous	  variation	  all	  around	  them.	  	  Synthesis	  of	  these	  two	  perspectives	  grew	  out	  of	  both	  the	  development	  of	  new	  conceptual	  ideas	  (e.g.,	  population	  genetics)	  and	  a	  greater	  willingness	  by	  all	  parties	  to	  accept	  ideas	  from	  competing	  perspectives.	  (A	  reduction	  in	  personal	  animosity	  between	  naturalists	  and	  geneticists	  and	  an	  increased	  professionalization	  of	  the	  study	  of	  evolution	  were	  especially	  important;	  Ruse,	  1996).	  	  In	  psychology,	  the	  need	  to	  synthesize	  insights	  from	  many	  different	  subdisciplines	  presses	  upon	  us	  now	  as	  much	  as	  ever.	  Evolutionary	  psychology	  is	  already	  a	  synthesis,	  of	  course-­‐between	  biology	  and	  psychology.	  However,	  a	  much	  broader	  set	  of	  influences	  must	  be	  more	  regularly	  tapped	  if	  we	  are	  to	  reach	  a	  synthesis	  that	  will	  use	  evolutionary	  concepts	  to	  increase	  our	  understanding	  of	  psychology.	  Rather	  than	  see	  developmental,	  physiological,	  and	  cognitive	  perspectives	  competing	  for	  status	  and	  funding,	  scholars	  should	  be	  searching	  for	  the	  synthesis	  that	  will	  unify	  these	  ideas	  into	  a	  new	  perspective	  on	  evolution	  and	  behavior.	  	  Although	  it	  is	  too	  little	  known	  in	  psychology,	  progress	  in	  this	  direction	  is	  being	  made.	  For	  example,	  the	  developmental	  systems	  approach	  to	  evolution	  (Griffiths	  &	  Gray,	  1994,	  2004;	  Oyama,	  Griffiths,	  &	  Gray,	  2000)	  draws	  on	  developmental	  psychology	  and	  developmental	  evolutionary	  biology	  to	  construct	  a	  model	  of	  natural	  selection	  that	  incorporates	  not	  just	  the	  genetic	  material	  transmitted	  from	  generation	  to	  generation	  but	  also	  the	  ontogenetic	  process	  whereby	  a	  phenotype	  is	  produced.	  According	  to	  this	  approach,	  "the	  fundamental	  unit	  that	  undergoes	  natural	  selection	  is	  neither	  the	  individual	  gene	  nor	  the	  phenotype,	  but	  the	  life	  cycle	  generated	  through	  the	  interaction	  of	  a	  developing	  organism	  with	  its	  environment	  ....	  
The	  'developmental	  system'	  is	  the	  whole	  matrix	  of	  resources	  that	  interacts	  to	  reconstruct	  that	  life	  cycle"	  (Griffiths	  &	  Gray,	  2004,	  p.	  2).	  Although	  these	  models	  have	  general	  relevance-­‐developmental	  processes	  shape	  every	  aspect	  of	  the	  phenotype-­‐	  the	  models	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  psychologists,	  with	  our	  long	  tradition	  of	  studying	  the	  developmental	  processes	  shaping	  the	  psyche.	  	  To	  cite	  just	  one	  other	  example,	  Quartz	  (2003)	  sketches	  an	  approach	  that	  also	  incorporates	  developmental	  processes	  in	  evolutionary	  psychology.	  He	  does	  so	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  developmental	  cognitive	  neuroscience,	  thereby	  bringing	  actual	  physical	  structure	  into	  the	  evolutionary	  psychological	  picture.	  Whereas	  the	  developmental	  systems	  approach	  stresses	  the	  role	  of	  selection,	  Quartz's	  developmental	  evolutionary	  psychology	  focuses	  much	  more	  on	  how	  developmental	  constraints	  shape	  the	  evolution	  of	  psychology.	  	  
Theories	  and	  ideologies	  	  The	  history	  of	  Darwinism	  shows	  us	  that	  we	  will	  lose	  much	  if	  we	  focus	  our	  attention	  only	  inward	  on	  our	  own	  perspective	  and	  refuse	  to	  be	  open	  to	  alternatives.	  Much	  of	  this	  inward	  focus	  can	  be	  at	  least	  partially	  traced	  to	  ideological	  commitments.	  However,	  Bowler's	  account	  makes	  clear	  that	  no	  particular	  ideological	  position	  is	  naturally	  supported	  by	  Darwinism.	  	  Although	  Karl	  Marx	  was	  skeptical	  of	  Darwin's	  theory	  because	  of	  its	  parallels	  with	  capitalism,	  he	  apparently	  appreciated	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  supported	  a	  materialist	  view	  of	  human	  nature.	  (Bowler	  explains	  that	  the	  claim	  that	  Marx	  offered	  to	  dedicate	  a	  volume	  of	  Das	  Capital	  to	  Darwin	  is	  a	  myth.)	  	  The	  horror	  of	  the	  eugenics	  movement	  in	  North	  America	  and	  Europe	  and	  the	  race	  theories	  of	  the	  Nazis	  often	  are	  seen	  as	  relying	  on	  evolutionary	  ideas,	  but	  in	  fact	  Hitler's	  "final	  solution"	  and	  the	  eugenics	  movement	  actually	  seek	  to	  subvert	  natural	  selection,	  imposing	  an	  artificial	  selection	  process	  on	  humans.	  	  Philosopher-­‐psychologistsJohn	  Dewey,	  WilliamJames,	  and	  Charles	  Peirce	  saw	  the	  triumph	  of	  Darwinism	  as	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  of	  freedom	  against	  genetic	  determinism	  because	  Darwinism	  destroyed	  the	  notion	  that	  nature	  was	  progressing	  toward	  some	  fixed	  goal.	  "Nature	  was	  inherently	  creative,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  constraints	  on	  evolution	  guaranteed	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  individual	  will,"	  Bowler	  observes	  (p.	  320).	  	  In	  our	  time,	  Bowler	  points	  out,	  many	  oppose	  the	  use	  of	  evolutionary	  theory	  in	  psychology	  because	  they	  hope	  to	  "block	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  who	  would	  use	  biology	  to	  endorse	  racist	  or	  other	  right-­‐wing	  ideologies."	  But,	  these	  opponents	  forget	  "that	  earlier	  advocates	  of	  theories	  similar	  to	  their	  own	  were	  capable	  of	  endorsing	  the	  policies	  they	  despise"	  (p.	  368).	  	  Finally,	  Bowler	  reminds	  us,	  "one	  of	  the	  most	  pessimistic	  predictions	  about	  the	  
future	  of	  humanity	  produced	  in	  the	  last	  century,	  Aldous	  Huxley's	  Brave	  New	  World,	  foresaw	  social	  conditioning	  through	  learning	  and	  environmental	  manipulation	  as	  the	  means	  by	  which	  our	  masters	  might	  enslave	  us-­‐all	  the	  time	  claiming	  that	  it	  was	  for	  our	  own	  good"	  (p.	  317).	  	  
Conclusions	  	  The	  history	  of	  Darwinism	  can	  serve	  us	  as	  a	  guide	  to	  how	  evolutionary	  psychology	  should	  proceed.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  ways	  for	  science	  to	  advance	  is	  not	  with	  a	  Kuhnian	  rejection	  of	  previous	  perspectives	  but	  with	  synthesis	  of	  multiple	  approaches	  into	  a	  new	  and	  more	  productive	  perspective.	  I	  have	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  multiple	  approaches	  vying	  for	  attention	  in	  evolutionary	  psychology	  (broadly	  construed)	  ultimately	  will	  lead	  to	  new	  and	  fertile	  developments	  in	  psychology.	  We	  can	  only	  hope	  that	  both	  evolutionary	  psychologists	  and	  their	  critics	  will	  learn	  the	  lessons	  of	  history	  and	  work	  toward	  a	  true	  new	  synthesis	  and	  that	  the	  new	  synthesis	  will	  be	  as	  productive	  as	  the	  early-­‐20th-­‐century	  synthesis	  was	  in	  evolutionary	  biology.	  	  Steven	  J.	  Scher	  
